It’s impossible to say. That said, however, when I see “BTG” I read it as “Vexillation,” a technique the Romans used for creating field armies when they couldn’t afford to pull entire legions out of the line. It’s a terrible approach, in general, because units’ commanders and staffs need to know and understand higher command and each other just as much as troops in the squad need to be socialized in order to fight well.

The Russians’ problem, I believe, stems from a faulty intelligence estimate. I think they looked at Operation Danube, the bludgeoning of Czechoslovakia back into comity with orthodox communism and the Warsaw Pact, the ease of operations in the Crimea, 7 years prior, the neglect the Ukies inflicted on their own armed forces for decades, the creditable performance of the DPR and LPR militias against the Ukrainian regular army and the Waffen S…oh, sorry, I meant to say the Asov Regiment, plus the election results in the last election, and read it as “Cakewalk; we’ll be welcomed with open arms.”

This explains their very light-handed approach with regards to air and artillery in the early days of the war, as well as the otherwise too fucking stupid to imagine road-bound offensive during the spring rasputitsa. All of these things made perfect sense IF the Ukies were going to fold quickly. Otherwise not. Really not. Dear God in Heaven NOT.

Note: Lesson 1: Never believe your own propaganda. Lesson 2: Don’t fully trust the intel weenies, either; military intelligence is oxymoronic, generally speaking.

The Russian middle classes have largely abandoned the armed forces, whereas it used to be a matter of pride, under communism, to hold at least a reserve commission. Yes, this is critical now.

I can’t recall a war being won or lost over personnel administration, but this one bids fair to be that one. If, during the remainder of the Rasputitsa, Putin can a) recall enough reservists to fill up the existing units, b1) find enough leadership, maybe some of it retired, to field another 5-6 divisions with maybe b2) battlefield commissions for some of the EM who’ve proven competent so that lieutenants can be pulled out to be provided to those reserve formations, and c) about a thousand batteries of artillery – yes, a thousand – then, no longer being road bound, they can just do what Russians do, blow great bloody holes in the Ukrainians defenses and pour through. But that all depends on finding the leadership.

I agree with your views, sir. The Neo-Tsar has effectively said as much. This is but the latest stage in a long-running war between two very different ideologies – globalism and the nation-state, as you say.

Sir, what is your opinion of the quantitative and qualitative differences in power and manoeuvrability of the Russian Battalion Tactical Group, versus the US/NATO Brigade Combat Team? This analysis from Fort Benning dates back to 2017, and apparently some of the issues identified early on in the piece have already been rectified. The ability of the Russians to rapidly encircle and destroy NATO-trained Ukrop military units indicates that the Russian General Staff have learned from their previous engagements against Ukraine in 2014-15.

Do you believe that the Russian BTG structure can take on NATO units in the European theatre effectively?