Fair points. I’d say they’re conventionally ready for war with Europe, but the unconventional dimension that is Europe’s biggest vulnerability still needs to be fully recognized. Occasional defense infrastructure ‘accidents’ notwitstanding.

And I agree that if Kaliningrad is attacked, all bets are off. I deleted “nobody would be stupid enough to…” from my vocabulary years ago, though I would give that scenario low odds.

I’ll add that we can hardly blame the Russians for being slow to understand that directly affecting affecting Clown World personnel is the only thing those narcissists can possibly care about. A vanishingly small percentage of the people who live in Clown World have internalized that truth.

We are not even close to there yet

In fact, we are. Lithuanian threats to annex or attack Kaliningrad, are a few steps below that threshold, according to their revised doctrine.

Take a breath, Didact, and calm down

Read what I wrote again, especially right at the end, before you accuse me of getting worked up. At no point have I said the Russians will go to war against the EUSSR tomorrow. Nor do I believe they will. As I said, very specifically, they will first finish off the SMO against Ukraine, then liberate Odessa, and THEN they will be READY for war with Europe.

This does not ergo mean they WILL go to war with Europe.

Personally, I do not believe the SMO will end before 2027. Russia has asymmetric options for escalation – to include cutting off all oil and natural gas to Europe, even that which is routed through India and Asian refiners. But it is becoming increasingly clear that the YURPEENS will not listen to anything short of an actual strike on their facilities. And the Russians, finally, are beginning to accept that reality.

Ukraine is proving more difficult than expected, in part because of the tech leap of drone war. Russia is executing its attrition war plans, with useful and unplanned co-belligerence from Iran targeting the USA and global economy. It has some responsiveness to public opinion, but the Russian way of war is left very much to the professionals. For good or ill, historically.

If Russia believes it must fight a war beyond Ukraine – what, then, is to be its war? If it embraces decision-makers are executors in truth, it has many opportunities. Can its system take the corresponding casualties in kind? What does the math say (and there will be maff) about each system’s power resilience if personnel start dropping? Is the enemy at a state where Russian wetworks will have accelerant effects, or consolidation effects?

Whatever the answers are, you know the Russians will study the questions for a while first. Probably with a major case of inertia on top. Just getting them to think in wetworks terms will probably require more events like this, because it may well require personnel changes.

Take a breath, Didact, and calm down. Even if the Russians are finally this angry, and they may well be, I think we’re going to be here in Limbo for longer than we’re comfortable with.

When you have a rabid animal cornered, it is nevertheless still dangerous, and Mr. Putin knows this.